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I. INTRODUCTION
Over thirty-five years ago a court1 first recognized a private
cause of action for damages under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934' and rule 10b-5.' Since then the courts have
used tort and criminal law principles to create causes of action
under rule 10b-5 and have expanded its scope of liability.' Al-
though nearly every court of appeals5 has addressed the question
whether the agency principle of respondeat superior is a proper ba-
sis for liability under rule 10b-5, not all of them have recognized a
cause of action under the doctrine.'
1. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) provides in relevant part: "It shall be un-
lawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . . to use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance . "
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Rule 10b-5 forbids a person
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
4. The courts have used tort and criminal law principles to impose secondary liability
under the securities acts. Courts impose this liability on defendants because of defendants'
relationship with the primary wrongdoer, not because of any direct violation of a securities
provision. The most widely used forms of secondary liability under the acts are aiding and
abetting, conspiracy, and respondeat superior. See Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAn. L. REv. 80 (1981); Ruder, Multiple Defen-
dants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto,
Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972).
5. Only the First and Eighth Circuits have not addressed this question. See infra au-
thorities cited notes 15-17.
Some courts believe the Eighth Circuit's decision in Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968), decided the respondeat superior question, see,
e.g., Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 714 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1011 (1980); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 885 (3d Cir. 1975) ("In Myzel v. Fields,
the Eighth Circuit indicated that liability for securities act violations was governed by sec-
tion 20(a) and not by any agency theories.") (citations omitted). In Myzel, however, the
Eighth Circuit actually did not consider the applicability of agency principles since it held
defendant liable under § 20(a) of the Securities Act of 1934. See 386 F.2d at 738.
6. The Third and Ninth Circuits have not adopted the respondeat superior cause of
action. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text; infra part II(A)2-3.
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Respondeat superior is the common-law principle that under
certain circumstances holds an employer responsible for the tor-
tious acts of his employees and agents by attributing to him their
conduct,7 even though he himself may lack any fault. The most
common use of respondeat superior is to hold an employer liable
for torts that his employees committed within the scope of their
employment.8 Respondeat superior also finds employer liability for
acts that are within the apparent authority of the employee and
upon which third parties have relied.9 Courts impose liability on
the basis of apparent authority even if the employee has acted
outside the scope of employment. 10
7. Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433
(1934). Respondeat superior attributes the employee's wrongful act to the employer, but it
does not attribute the employee's knowledge. Section 272 of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY (1958), however, provides the basis for imputing the employee's knowledge to the
employer and thus is distinguishable from respondeat superior. See Brief of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 13 n.17, Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649
F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
8. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958). See id. § 228 for a definition of
scope of employment.
9. Seavey describes respondeat superior as follows:
Respondeat superior, as the phrase is commonly used, summarizes the doctrine that a
master or other principal is responsible, under certain conditions, for the conduct of a
servant or other agent although he did not intend or direct it. In practice, it is used
chiefly with reference to the liability of a master for the torts of a servant, but its
principle includes, as well, the liability of one who is not a master for the undirected
contracts made for him by his agent in cases in which there is not the obvious contract
basis, such as exists where the agent has apparent authority. Similar reasons lie back of
the rules established for both types of situation.
Seavey, supra note 7, at 433.
At least one commentator distinguishes respondeat superior liability from the liability
imposed on employers or principals for the misrepresentations that an employee or agent
makes and upon which third parties rely. Ferson, Bases for Master's Liability and for Prin-
cipal's Liability to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. Rav. 260, 264 (1951) ("[T]he two doctrines
grew up separately and.., they pertain to different situations. The doctrine of respondeat
superior pertains to torts; the doctrine that a principal is bound by the authorized act of his
agent pertains to contracts."). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 257 (1958) contains this
principle. See also Comment, Rule 10b-5 and Vicarious Liability Based on Respondeat Su-
perior, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1513, 1513-14 n.7, 1517 n.27, 1536-37 n.111 (1981).
Clearly, the courts and other commentators recognize that the apparent authority doc-
trine is part of respondeat superior. See Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884 (3d Cir.
1975); 10 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 4886 (rev. ed. 1978). The justification for
apparent authority liability in the contractual context is equally strong in the case of tor-
tious misrepresentations and, therefore, the two are indistinguishable. As one court has
stated, "The underlying reason is that a corporation can speak and act only through its
agents and so must be accountable for any acts committed by one of its agents within his
actual or apparent scope of authority and while transacting corporate business." Rochez
Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d at 884.
10. An employee's action is not within the scope of employment if he did not act, at
least in part, with an intent to benefit the employer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
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Some courts11 refuse to accept the respondeat superior cause
of action in rule 10b-5 cases because section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,12 through its "controlling persons "is provi-
sion, is sufficiently broad to impose secondary liability on the basis
of employment relationships. This section, however, contains a
special defense which provides that a controlling person is not lia-
ble if he acted in good faith and did not induce the violation. Thus,
the scope of liability under section 20(a) presumably is narrower
than under respondeat superior.14
The majority of courts15 hold that section 20(a) does not pre-
§ 228(1)(c) (1958). Under apparent authority analysis, an employee who acts with the sole
intent of furthering his personal interest still may subject his employer to liability if a third
party (1) reasonably believes that the employee is acting within his actual authority and (2)
relies upon the employee to his detriment. See infra part III(A)2. See also RESTATSmENT
(SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 262 (1958).
11. See infra authorities cited note 16.
12. Section 20(a) provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any pro-
vision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith
and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or
cause of action.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. 78t(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
13. Courts have interpreted broadly the term "control" in § 20(a). Under this ap-
proach, an employer controls his employee within the meaning of § 20(a) and is subject to
liability as a controlling person. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1515 n.18 (1981). The 1934
Act defines a "person" as follows: "The term 'person' means a natural person, company,
government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government." Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(9) (1976).
14. Respondeat superior does not contain a good faith defense because it imposes lia-
bility on an employer regardless of fault-thus, the employer's intent is irrelevant. The
courts and several commentators contend that the availability of the good faith defense
under § 20(a) reduces the employer's scope of liability for employees' securities violations.
Therefore, the employer's opportunity to disprove liability by relying upon the good faith
defense depends upon the court's determination of whether respondeat superior applies; if it
does not apply, the employer may use the good faith defense. See, e.g., Paul F. Newton &
Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980); Marbury Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Note,
Vicarious Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Securities Acts, 11 Lov. L.A.L. REv.
151 (1977); Comment, supra note 9; Comment, A Comparison of Control Person Liability
and Respondeat Superior: Section 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 CAL. W.L.
REv. 152 (1979).
15. The courts of appeals for the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits have adopted the majority approach. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Premex, Inc., 655 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1981); Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d
880 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 669 (1981); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas
Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629
F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th
Cir. 1975); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); Fey v. Walston
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empt the use of respondeat superior in securities cases because, in
enacting the section, Congress did not intend to limit the remedies
available to investors. A minority of jurisdictionss refuse to recog-
nize respondeat superior on the ground'that to do so would nullify
the good faith defense of section 20(a) and thereby impose liability
upon employers or principals who do not possess the requisite cul-
pability or bad faith that Congress envisioned. Finally, the Third
Circuit 17 follows a general rule that section 20(a) preempts the use
of agency principles, but it recognizes an exception for broker-deal-
ers and accounting firms, who owe the investing public a higher
standard of care in supervising their employees.28
This Note demonstrates that the scope of employer liability
for employees' rule 10b-5 violations is no broader under a proper
application of respondeat superior than under section 20(a). This
Note does not address the question whether respondeat superior
applies under rule 10b-5, but rather how courts should apply it.
& Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.
1974); Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton,
422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970); Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1970);
Carroll v. First Nat'l Bank, 413 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970);
Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1982); American Gen'l Ins.
Co. v. Equitable Gen'l Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Va. 1980); Kravitz v. Pressman, Froh-
lich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203 (D. Mass. 1978). But see National Bank of Detroit v.
Whitehead & Kales Co., 528 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Haynes v. Anderson & Strud-
wick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Va. 1981); infra part H(A).
16. The Ninth Circuit follows the minority approach. See, e.g., Christoffel v. E.F. Hut-
ton & Co., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.
1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968). Although the Fifth Circuit in Paul F. Newton &
Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980), noted that the Kamen court
did not address directly the issue of the applicability of agency principles; the Zweig and
Christoffel courts cited Kamen as authority for their minority view decisions. The Ninth
Circuit now recognizes as "established law" that § 20(a) supplants use of respondeat supe-
rior under the securities acts. See Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 667 (9th
Cir. 1978); Kersh v. General Council of the Assemblies of God, 535 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Cal.
1982); infra part II(B).
17. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981); Gould v. American-
Hawaiian Steamship Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d
880 (3d Cir. 1975); Walsh v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 452 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Pa. 1978); infra part
II(C).
18. See Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981) (respondeat superior
applied to impose liability on an accounting firm). The Third Circuit has not yet held a
broker-dealer liable under respondeat superior but has stated that it will do so when the
occasion arises. See Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975); Straub v.
Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); Walsh v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 452 F. Supp. 80
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (held broker-dealer exception of Rochez Brothers applies to respondeat su-
perior); see also Plunkett v. Dominick & Dominick, 414 F. Supp. 885 (D. Conn. 1976) (noted
broker-dealer exception available).
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Part II examines the majority, minority, and Third Circuit deci-
sions on employer liability. Part III discusses the traditional analy-
sis under both respondeat superior and section 20(a) and compares
the scope of liability under each one. Part III concludes that ex-
cept for an employer's liability for acts that are within an em-
ployee's apparent authority yet outside the scope of employment,
the results are identical in all cases under either respondeat supe-
rior or section 20(a). Thus, courts place too much emphasis on the
good faith defense of section 20(a). Part IV analyzes the effect of
the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder" on
the respondeat superior cause of action. Because Hochfelder firmly
establishes scienter2 0 as a requirement in a rule 10b-5 cause of ac-
tion, courts now must use respondeat superior to impute to the
employer not only the employee's conduct but also his intent. In
criminal cases respondeat superior often serves to impute both an
employee's conduct and intent to a corporation or partnership for
crimes that require specific intent. Part V of this Note examines
the limitations of respondeat superior in imputing conduct and in-
tent to an entity in criminal case law, the Model Penal Code, and
proposed federal criminal code provisions. Ultimately, this Note
concludes that in view of the scienter requirement, those restric-
tions should apply to rule 10b-5 actions to limit employer liability
to those cases in which an employee acts within the scope of em-
ployment with the intent to benefit the employer. Under this ap-
proach the distinction vanishes between the scope of secondary lia-
bility under respondeat superior and under section 20(a).
II. REsPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND SECTION 20(a)-THE CONFLICT IN
THE CIRCUITS
The legislative history of section 20(a) provides support for
both the majority and minority positions on the applicability of
respondeat superior to rule 10b-5 violations.2 1 The ambiguity of
19. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
20. The Court defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manip-
ulate, or defraud." Id. at 194 n.12.
21. Section 20(a) does not cover expressly employment or agency relationships. The
drafters of § 20(a) modeled the provision after § 15 of the Securities Act of 1933. See Securi-
ties Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976), as amended by Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 208, 48 Stat. 881, 908. Section 15 sought to "preven[t] directors
from evading the liabilities incident to signing the registration statement" by using
"dummy" directors to sign the statements. S. REP. No. 51, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). As
originally enacted, § 15 imposed liability upon a person who, through stock ownership,
agency, or otherwise, controls someone liable under §§ 11 or 12 of the 1933 Act. See Securi-
1388 [Vol. 35:1383
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Congress' intent in enacting this section allows a court to structure
its analysis of the legislative history to suit its conclusion on em-
ployer liability. Although the results in these cases, with few excep-
tions, are sensible, this result-oriented approach leads to strained
application of respondeat superior principles.
A. The Majority Approach
Recently, the Fifth Circuit in Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas
Commerce Bank2 recognized a claim against a brokerage firm for
the fraudulent conduct of its employee based upon the theory of
respondeat superior. In Newton a registered representative of
Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Incorporated violated rule 10b-5 by
participating in an elaborate scheme to inflate the price of an over-
the-counter stock. The employee used his firm's name as market
maker in the stock.23 A brokerage firm that purchased some of the
stock at the inflated price and eventually lost all of its investment
sued Pressman under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The dis-
trict court refused to apply respondeat superior and dismissed the
brokerage firm's section 20(a) claim on grounds that Pressman did
ties Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 15, 48 Stat. 74, 84 (current version of 15 U.S.C. § 77).
At the time of the passage of § 20(a) of the 1934 Act, Congress amended this provision to
include a good faith defense. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §
208, 18 Stat. 881, 908.
The minority approach focuses on the use of the term "agency" in § 15. These courts
argue that since the drafters specifically included agency relationships within the scope of §
15 and since the House Report on § 20(a) also names agency as an example of control, see
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1934), Congress must have intended to sup-
plant use of common-law agency principles by enacting § 20(a). See Comment, supra note
14, at 173-74 (1977). Further, proponents of the minority viewpoint argue that the inclusion
of a good faith defense in § 20(a) indicates Congress' rejection of the imposition of liability
without fault upon the employer. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 98-99.
The majority approach argues that the inclusion of the word "agency" in the original
version of § 15 and the mention of the term in the House Report on § 20(a) are insufficient
to support a finding that Congress intended to'preempt use of agency principles by enacting
§ 20(a). Moreover, since the purpose of § 20(a) is to prohibit use of dummies to commit
securities violations, "the defenses contained in each section represent a congressional judg-
ment that directors, officers, and major shareholders who control securities act violators
should not be held strictly liable." Comment, supra note 9, at 1527. Because the legislative
history of § 20(a) does not indicate any intent on the part of Congress to provide employers
specifically with a good faith defense, nothing precludes the imposition of liability on em-
ployers through respondeat superior even though they are without fault. Id.
22. 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980).
23. Id. at 1113. A market maker is a middleman between the buyer and his broker and
the seller and his broker. A firm announces that it is willing to act as a market maker in a
particular over-the-counter stock by listing its name in the "pink sheets'"-the daily publi-
cations that list over-the-counter stocks and the market makers for the stocks. Pressman's
employee listed the firm's name in the pink sheets as market maker for the stock. Id.
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not have knowledge of the employee's scheme and did not partici-
pate in the fraud.24 The court of appeals reversed, holding that re-
spondeat superior applies in federal securities cases.25 The court
decided that the legislative history of section 20(a) was inconclu-
sive, and hence chose to interpret broadly the securities statutes.26
The court reasoned that a rule limiting liability to section 20(a) in
this specific factual context
would enable the brokerage firm to escape liability under the reasoning of
some circuits merely by showing that it did not "culpably participate" in the
fraud committed by its employee .... To allow a brokerage firm to avoid
secondary liability simply by showing ignorance, purposeful or negligent, of
the acts of its registered representatives contravenes Congress's intent to pro-
tect the public, particularly unsophisticated investors, from fraudulent
practices.27
The court applied respondeat superior and held Pressman liable
for its employee's conduct.
B. The Minority Approach
In Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton" the Ninth Circuit espoused
support for the minority view that section 20(a) preempts the use
of agency principles in federal securities cases.29 In Christoffel an
estate brought an action against E.F. Hutton for losses sustained
because of an account executive's fraud. The account executive
had been guardian of the decedent while she was alive.30 E.F. Hut-
ton had allowed its employee to act as guardian but required ex-
pressly that he supply the firm with court approval for every trans-
action. The account executive diverted funds from approved sales
for his own use. Besides the account executive's own illegal inten-
tions, "no kind of fraud, misrepresentation, or unfair dealing
tainted any of the sales of stocks effected through [E.F.] Hut-
ton."8 1 The court of appeals stated that "the sole basis" of plain-
24. Id. at 1114.
25. Id. at 1118-19.
26. Id. at 1118 ("The federal securities statutes are remedial legislation and must be
construed broadly, not technically and restrictively.").
27. Id. at 1118-19.
28. 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978).
29. The Ninth Circuit never has analyzed fully the respondeat superior issue; rather, it
has relied on the decision in Kamen & Co. v. Paul H. Aschkar & Co., 382 F.2d 689 (9th Cir.
1967), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968) as authority for its position. See Comment, supra
note 9, at 1517-19 (1981); supra note 16.
30. The estate's deceased was an elderly woman who had been declared incompetent.
Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d at 666.
31. Id. at 667.
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tiffs' respondeat superior claim against E.F. Hutton was "its em-
ployment of Schwager as an account executive during the time
that he was also acting as guardian for the. . estate." 3 The court
concluded that Congress intended section 20(a) liability to be more
restrictive than respondeat superior liability because section 20(a)
requires that the controlling person participate in the fraud to
some extent.33 Finding that section 20(a) was the exclusive means
of secondary employer liability, the court dismissed the claim be-
cause E.F. Hutton did not control the account executive in his
guardianship activities within the meaning of the section.3
C. The Third Circuit
In Rochez Brothers v. Rhoades3 5 and Sharp v. Coopers &
Lybrand3 6 the Third Circuit combined the analyses and reasoning
of both the majority and minority decisions, but placed great em-
phasis on the nature of the defendant's business: whether the de-
fendant was under a strong duty to supervise employees to protect
the investing public. In Rochez Brothers the president of the cor-
poration MS&R fraudulently purchased MS&R stock from Rochez
Brothers, which sued MS&R and based its claim on respondeat su-
perior. The district court found that the president of MS&R never
had represented to Rochez Brothers that he was acting on behalf
of his employer when purchasing the stock; therefore the court re-
fused to hold MS&R liable because its president did not act within
the scope of his employment.3 7
The court of appeals held that agency principles were inappli-
cable and dismissed the complaint.38 The court reasoned:
If we were to apply respondeat superior... we would in essence impose a
duty on a corporation to supervise and oversee the activities of its directors
and employees when they are dealing with their own corporate stock as indi-
viduals, and not for the corporation or for the benefit of the corporation. To
impose such a duty would make the corporation primarily liable for any se-
curity law violation by any officer of the corporation. We believe Congress did
not intend to expand liability to this degree when it passed the Securities
Exchange Act.3'
32. Id.
33. Id. at 668.
34. Id. at 669. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that only a court had the legal power to
control the account executive while he acted as guardian of the estate. Id. at 668.
35. 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).
36. 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
37. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 390 F. Supp. 470 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
38. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d at 880, 884-86.
39. Id. at 885.
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The Rochez Brothers court noted, however, that respondeat supe-
rior may be appropriate in certain cases, such as claims against
broker-dealers, because of a need for a high standard of care in
supervising employees of firms that may influence greatly the in-
vesting public.40
The Third Circuit in Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand4' applied
the Rochez Brothers broker-dealer exception to an accounting
firm. In Sharp Coopers & Lybrand issued two tax opinion letters
on a limited partnership tax shelter written by one of its tax super-
visors. The second letter contained misrepresentations concerning
the amount of deductions that the limited partnership investment
would generate; several potential investors received the letter. 2
The supervising partner at Coopers & Lybrand did not review and
approve the letter before it left the office. The court distinguished
this factual situation from the one presented in Rochez Brothers
by emphasizing the duty of Coopers & Lybrand to protect the
public:
In this situation, the absence of actual knowledge of or a reckless disregard
for material omissions or misrepresentations should not insulate Coopers &
Lybrand from liability because the expectation that investment decisions
would be made on the basis of the opinion letter required the firm to exercise
a "stringent duty to supervise" its employees in drafting and issuing the let-
ter. Under the circumstances of this case viz, the existence of actual knowl-
edge that the firm's letter would influence the investing public, we cannot
distinguish the responsibility of the accounting firm here from the broker-
dealer discussed in [Rochez Brothers]2s
The court applied respondeat superior and held Coopers &
Lybrand liable under rule 10b-5."
D. Synthesis of the Majority, Minority, and Third Circuit
Approaches
In framing the issues for review, the courts in both Rochez
Brothers and Christoffel used language that contrasts with the lan-
40. The court stated: "We are not faced with the type of relationship that prevails in
the broker-dealer cases where a stringent duty .... is imposed to protect the investing
public and make brokers aware of their special responsibility they owe to their customers."
Id. at 886.
41. 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
42. Id. at 178-79.
43. Id. at 184. The court also noted, "A simple garden variety master-servant relation-
ship is not what activates the doctrine of respondeat superior in this case. Rather, the pres-
ence of what we described in [Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975)1 as a
'stringent' or high duty to supervise employees triggers the doctrine." Id.
44. Id. at 184-85.
[Vol. 35:13831392
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND § 20(a)
guage of the Sharp and Newton courts. In Rochez Brothers the
court focused on the unreasonableness of holding a corporation vi-
cariously liable for the fraudulent acts of its employee while he was
dealing with his own corporate stock.45 In Christoffel the court de-
termined that the "sole basis" of Christoffel's claim was E.F. Hut-
ton's employment of the account executive while he acted as
guardian of the estate.4 6 Each court concluded that Congress en-
acted section 20(a) to ensure that courts would extend secondary
liability under the securities acts only to those controlling persons
who are involved culpably in securities fraud. The courts thereby
shielded both MS&R and E.F. Hutton from respondeat superior
liability.
In Sharp the Third Circuit sounded a different tone. Focusing
on Coopers & Lybrand's breach of its duty to supervise, the court
refrained from taking a restrictive view of the legislative history of
section 20(a)47 and "insulating" the firm from liability. Similarly,
the Newton court refused to follow the preemptive approach and
allow Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Incorporated to "escape liabil-
ity.' 48 Interpreting section 20(a) broadly on the ground that Con-
gress did not intend to limit investors' remedies, these courts in-
creased the scope of employer liability and provided a remedy to
the plaintiffs.
The result in each of the four cases is sensible. The courts'
application of agency principles, however, technically is incorrect
even though employer liability intuitively is appropriate. For ex-
ample, the Sharp court's emphasis upon a defendant's duty to su-
pervise is inconsistent with respondeat superior analysis. Respon-
deat superior requires attribution of the conduct of an employee to
the employer;49 it differs from other recognized forms of secondary
liability, such as aiding and abetting and conspiracy, because it ap-
plies without regard to the employer's fault.50 Liability based on
45. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d at 885-86.
46. Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1978).
47. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 1981).
48. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th Cir.
1980).
49. See supra note 8.
50. The aiding and abetting action under rule 10b-5 derives from tort law. A defen-
dant is liable under this theory
[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another... if he
... (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of a duty and gives sub-
stantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives
substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own con-
duct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.
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failure to supervise, however, requires some fault on the part of the
employer. Breach of this duty is per se a form of primary liability
and does not trigger necessarily the direct attribution of conduct to
the employer under respondeat superior.51
Implicit in each of these decisions is the misconception that
respondeat superior imposes strict liability on employers for their
employees' every act. For example, the court in Rochez Brothers
stated that the use of respondeat superior would result in a hold-
ing that MS&R was liable.52 Traditional requirements of respon-
deat superior-scope of employment and apparent author-
ity-limit liability under this theory, for the facts must meet these
criteria before a court will find employer liability.53 In the next
part this Note outlines the respondeat superior framework, com-
pares it with the analysis under section 20(a), and demonstrates
that in most cases the results are the same under either approach.
III. THE SCOPE OF LIAIuTY UNDER RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND
SECTION 20(a)
Traditionally, courts have advanced several justifications for
holding an employer responsible for his employees' acts under re-
spondeat superior:n " The employer controlled the acts of his em-
ployee; the employer decided to hire and entrust the employee
with various duties in return for the anticipated profit from per-
formance of his job; the employment provided the employee with
the opportunity to commit the wrong; and the employer should
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939). Conspriracy liability also requires the defendant's
knowledge and participation in the fraud. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 83-85.
51. Breach of the duty to supervise constitutes primary liability when the duty dele-
gated by the employer is a nondelegable one. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
52. "If we were to apply respondeat superior ... we would in essence impose a duty
• . . [that] would make the corporation primarily liable for any security law violation by any
officer or employee of the corporation." Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d at 885.
53. See Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th Cir.
1980). The court stated that
[t]o utilize common-law agency principles to determine secondary liability for viola-
tions of the securities acts does not expose corporations, employers, and other such
potential defendants to strict liability for all acts of their agents or cause them to be-
come insurers of their agent's actions. The familiar requirements of agency that the
agent act within the course and scope of his employment and that he act within his
actual or apparent authority serve to restrict the scope of the principal's liability.
Id.
54. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 459 (4th ed. 1971); Douglas,
Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk II, 38 YALE L.J. 720, 722 (1929); Ferson,
supra note 9, at 263, 270-74; Seavey, supra note 7, at 447; Brief of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, supra note 7, at 15 n.21.
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have an incentive to conduct his business safely. Another more
modern justification for respondeat superior is the "deep pocket"
theory-that is, the employer should bear the risk of loss as part of
the cost of doing business because he can better absorb the
financial loss caused by the employee than can an innocent third
party.55 Under this rationale, the goal of applying respondeat supe-
rior is to provide compensation: the employer should pay for the
damages caused by an employee, regardless of his culpability. Con-
versely, the traditional approaches emphasize some affirmative
conduct on the part of the employer. As this part of the Note ex-
plains, the determination of whether the purpose of respondeat su-
perior is fault-based or compensatory affects greatly the scope of
respondeat superior liability under rule 10b-5.
A. Respondeat Superior
1. Scope of Employment
The definition of scope of employment is flexible, as one com-
mentator pointed out by describing it as "so devoid of meaning
itself that its very ingeniousness has been of value in permitting a
desirable degree of flexibility in decisions." 6 The Restatement
(Second) of Agency enumerates several factors that courts examine
to determine whether an employee acted within the scope of his
employment: "(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of em-
ployment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to
perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and
space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to
serve the master . . . ."5 Tortious conduct is within the scope of
employment if the employee's acts satisfy these requirements.58
One of the most difficult determinations in securities cases is
whether the employee's conduct is of the type his employer hired
him to perform. Obviously, if an employer has authorized the spe-
cific conduct, it is within the scope of employment.59 When the em-
ployer has not authorized the activity, however, courts examine
55. W. PROSSER, supra note 54, at 459; Douglas, supra note 54, at 722; Seavey, supra
note 7.
56. W. PROSSER, supra note 54, at 460.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).
58. Id. § 231 provides that "[a]n act may be within the scope of employment although
consciously criminal or tortious."
59. See id. § 229, comment a (1958). "As stated in Section 212, a master is responsible
for an act or result which he intends the servant to perform or achieve if the servant acts
because of his directions." Id.
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several factors to determine whether it resembles sufficiently the
authorized conduct to fall within the scope of employment. These
criteria include the following: Whether the act is one that is done
commonly by employees; the nature of the previous relations be-
tween the employer and employee; whether the act is outside the
scope of the employer's business; whether the employer has reason
to expect that this type of conduct will occur; and the extent of
departure from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized
result.0 0
Lewis v. Walston & Co."' illustrates the use of these factors in
making the scope of employment determination in the securities
context.6 2 In Lewis plaintiffs Lewis and MacDonald sued Walston
& Co., a brokerage firm, and its registered representative, De-
Casenave, for damages due to losses from the purchase of unregis-
tered securities of Allied Automation (Allied). For an extended pe-
riod, DeCasenave strongly recommended the Allied stock to
plaintiffs, who were longtime Walston customers.6 3 Gaff, the Wal-
ston manager who supervised DeCasenave, knew that she was pro-
moting the stock and advised her to limit her recommendations to
less risky investments. Gaff, however, never discussed the Allied
stock with plaintiffs and never ordered DeCasenave to stop her ef-
forts.e4 Plaintiffs purchased some Allied stock and subsequently
suffered losses. The court found DeCasenave guilty of violating
section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and held the brokerage
firm liable for her conduct based on the theory of respondeat supe-
rior.6 5 The court reasoned that DeCasenave acted within the scope
of her employment.6 6
Walston argued unsuccessfully that DeCasenave acted outside
60. Id. § 229(2)(a), (c)-(f), & (i) (1958).
61. 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973).
62. Although Lewis arose out of a claim under § 12(1)-(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1976), and not under rule 10b-5, the court's analysis is useful as an
illustration of the scope of employment determination.
63. Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d at 619. DeCasenave told the investors that this
machine company was a "potential IBM." She described the company, discussed its plans
for product development, showed plaintiffs the compr ny's literature, emphasized its growth
potential, and urged them to get in on the "ground floor" of this investment. Id.
64. Id. at 620.
65. Id. at 624.
66. Id. at 623. The court found that recommending the Allied stock, informing cus-
tomers of developments in the company they were considering as an investment, and ar-
ranging the mechanics of the purchase and sale were "'acts commonly done' by brokers...;
at the very least, they... [are] 'similar in quality' to acts brokers are routinely authorized
to perform." Id.
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the scope of employment by selling the Allied stock because Wal-
ston did not deal in unregistered securities; DeCasenave departed
from her routine by failing to place the order through the New
York office; Gaff advised DeCasenave against dealing in the stock;
and Walston did not receive any commission on sales of Allied
stock.6 Citing the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the court rea-
soned that even if Walston did not authorize the sale of unregis-
tered stock, the transaction was, nevertheless, within the scope of
employment because it was "sufficiently similar" to authorized
conduct.68 The court rejected Walston's argument that the transac-
tion occurred in an unusual manner, stating that "[b]rokers may
and do take many actions in the course of their dealings with cus-
tomers that do not relate directly to transactions executed through
the brokerage house .... ,9 The court viewed Gaff's advice to
DeCasenave as a personal recommendation, not as one made in his
official capacity as a Walston manager. 70 Finally, because "the
scope of employment does not require that the act have conferred
any particular benefit, financial or otherwise, in the employer," the
court described as "not of controlling importance" Walston's argu-
ment that it gained no financial benefit from DeCasenave's sales.7 1
In its analysis of the benefit requirement in the scope of em-
ployment determination, the Lewis court recognized that the im-
portant consideration is whether the employee intended to benefit
the employer, not whether the employer actually received a bene-
fit. Section 235 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency defines the
benefit requirement as follows: "An act of a servant is not within
the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform
it as a part of or incident to a service on account of which he is
employed. '7 2 The comments to this section explain that when an
employer authorized or directed his employee's conduct, an infer-
ence arises that the servant intended to benefit the employer and
thus, that he acted within the scope of his employment .7 Even if a
dual purpose of serving both the employer and himself motivated
the employee's conduct, his actions may be within the scope of
67. Id. at 623-24.
68. Id. at 624. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229(2) (1958). See supra text
accompanying note 60.
69. Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 624 (5th Cir. 1973).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 235 (1958).
73. Id. Comment a. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
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employment.7 4
Notwithstanding that the proper focus is upon the employee's
state of mind, many courts place importance-particularly in scope
of employment cases concerning brokerage firms-upon whether
the employer received any actual benefit. In particular, if the em-
ployer received a commission from the employee's act, courts con-
clude frequently that a desire to serve the master motivated the
employee's conduct in part.75
2. Apparent Authority
In Holloway v. Howerdd7 6 plaintiffs claimed that TSI, a
brokerage firm, was liable under respondeat superior for the acts of
its registered representative, Tucker. Tucker had violated section
12(2) of the 1933 Act7 7 by selling over $100,000 worth of unregis-
tered stock in Modular Properties, Inc. (Modular) to more than
140 people. At trial Tucker testified that he had advised many in-
vestors that he was allowing them to buy the stock as a personal
favor and that he was not acting as a representative of TSI in the
transaction. Tucker had used only his personal stationery when he
wrote to any of the investors and did not charge them any commis-
sion. He testified, however, that he failed to inform some investors
that he was not representing TSI in the transaction.7 8
TSI contended that it did not know or have reason to know
that Tucker participated in the illegal stock sales. The firm
pointed to the close system of supervision its manager maintained
over its registered representatives. Further, TSI argued that it was
not liable because it did not deal in shares of Modular and did not
receive any commission on Tucker's sales.7
Determining that agency principles applied under the securi-
ties acts, the Sixth Circuit found TSI liable only to those buyers
who were aware of Tucker's status with TSI and dealt with him in
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 236 (1958). See id. § 235 comment b.
75. See, e.g., Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); Christoffel v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1975); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417
(N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
76. 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976). The district court opinion is set forth at 377 F. Supp.
754 (M.D. Tenn. 1973).
77. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976). The Holloway decision provides an example of the use
of the apparent authority doctrine under the securities acts. No court has decided a 10b-5
respondeat superior case on the ground of apparent authority. See Comment, supra note 9,
at 1513-14 n.7.
78. Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d at 693-94.
79. Id. at 695.
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that capacity.80 It refused to extend TSI's liablity to those persons
who purchased the stock from Tucker with clear knowledge that
he was acting in his individual capacity and not as a TSI represen-
tative.81 Thus, the court did not base its decision upon a finding
that Tucker acted within the scope of his employment, but that he
acted as an agent "within his apparent or ostensible authority.""2
Further, the court justified its liability decision on the ground that
even though TSI usually did not deal in unregistered securities, it
was under an affirmative duty to prevent the use of the firm's rep-
utation to defraud the investing public.83
Although the Sixth Circuit did not discuss the apparent au-
thority analysis in great detail, the result in this case indicates
clearly that the court imposed liability without regard to the em-
ployee's intent." This lack of a requirement that the employee
acted to benefit the employer distinguishes respondeat superior li-
ability for acts within apparent authority from respondeat superior
liability for conduct within the scope of employment. In Holloway
Tucker acted with the sole intent of benefiting himself. Thus, his
sale of Modular stock was not within the scope of his employment.
Under apparent authority analysis, however, the court could ex-
tend TSI's respondeat superior liability to those investors who re-
lied on Tucker's relationship with TSI, even though Tucker acted
outside the scope of his employment. Although apparent authority
liability is broader than scope of employment liability, the courts
rarely have relied upon it to find vicarious liability in securities
80. Id. at 696. ("The general law of agency recognizes that a principal is bound by the
acts of an agent done within his apparent or ostensible authority.").
81. The court stated:
"A general agent for a disclosed or partially disclosed principal subjects his principal to
liability for acts done on his account which usually accompany or are incidental to
authorized conduct if, although they are forbidden by the principal, the other party
reasonably believes that the agent is authorized to do them and has no notice that he is
not so authorized."
Id. at 696 (quoting REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 161 (1957)).
82. 536 F.2d at 696.
83. Id. ("When its agents are dealing individually in the sale of securities TSI must be
clearly disassociated from those transactions, as otherwise it will incur liability on the basis
of respondeat superior for the fraudulent misrepresentations of its agents.").
84. An employer is held liable under the apparent authority doctrine for an em-
ployee's fraudulent acts upon which third parties rely. Courts may impose apparent author-
ity liability even if an employee is acting outside the scope of employment and solely to
further his personal interests. Courts consider primarily whether a third party reasonably
believed that the employee was acting within his scope of employment-the employee's in-





Section 20(a) states that "[e]very person who, directly or indi-
rectly, controls any person" who commits a securities violation is
liable to the same extent as the controlled person "unless the con-
trolling person acted in good faith and did not directly or indi-
rectly induce . . . the violation."8 The defendant's control of the
primary wrongdoer is the threshold issue under section 20(a). The
legislative history of section 20(a) suggests that Congress was not
contemplating employment relationships when it enacted the pro-
vision. 7 The term "control," however, is broad enough to include
these types of relationships.8 Accordingly, courts have held bro-
kerage and accounting firms liable as controlling persons of their
employees within the meaning of this section.8 9 A mere showing
that an employment relationship exists, however, does not estab-
lish automatically section 20(a) control. For example, in Christof-
fel90 the court held that E.F. Hutton did not control its account
executive while he acted as guardian of the estate, even though he
was an E.F. Hutton employee.9 1 In the context of the employment
relationship, "control" clearly refers to control of the employee in
the circumstances under which the violation occurred.
The majority of courts,92 several commentators," and the Se-
85. See supra note 77.
86. See supra note 12 for the full text of § 20(a).
87. See supra note 21; see also Comment, supra note 9, at 1515 n.18.
88. Comment, supra note 9, at 1515 n.18.
89. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 1981) (account-
ing firm controls tax supervisor employee); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d
705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980) (brokerage firm found in dicta to have
controlled trainees-case decided on respondeat superior grounds).
90. Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); see supra notes 28-
34 & 45-52 and accompanying texts.
91. Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d at 667-68. Similarly, the Rochez Broth-
ers court held that MS&R did not control Rhoades within the meaning of § 20(a). See
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889-91 (3d Cir. 1975).
It is our belief that Rhoades was the "controlling person," not MS&R. Rhoades was
Chairman of the Board, chief executive officer and President of MS&R and owned fifty
per cent of the issued and outstanding stock. Rhoades ran the day-to-day business
activities of MS&R and obviously had the power to influence the policies and actions of
MS&R. Rochez's argument that MS&R is a "controlling person" must therefore fail
because Rhoades and MS&R cannot simultaneously be "controlling persons" as to each
other.
Id. at 891. (emphasis in original). See supra notes 35-40 & 45-52 and accompanying texts.
92. See, e.g., Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (3d Cir.
1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
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curities and Exchange Commission94 interpret section 20(a) to pro-
vide that once the plaintiff establishes control, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant controlling person to demonstrate the good
faith and noninducement elements of the section's special defense.
The defendant satisfies the good faith element if he shows that he
"maintained and enforced a reasonable and proper system of su-
pervision . . . over controlled persons so as to prevent, so far as
possible, violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."' 5 Courts have
not addressed specifically the noninducement element of the
defense.
The standard of supervision required of a firm that is not
under a strict duty to protect the investing public is set forth in
Zweig v. Hearst Corp.6e In that case Campbell, a financial colum-
nist with the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, wrote a column prais-
ing the financial condition, product line, and management of a cor-
poration. Campbell did not reveal in the article that he recently
had purchased stock in this company. The price of the stock in-
creased sharply after publication of Campbell's column; he sold his
investment for a profit, and eventually, the stock price dropped.
Plaintiffs sued Campbell for causing fluctuations in the stock price
in violation of rule 10b-5 and sued Hearst Corporation as Camp-
bell's controlling person under section 20(a).
After finding that Hearst Corporation was a controlling person
within the meaning of section 20(a),' 7 the court declined to hold a
newspaper to the high standard of supervision required of broker-
dealers. The court reasoned that "to liken the relationship between
a newspaper owner publishing financial news and a reader-investor
to the practically fiduciary relationship between the broker and his
1011 (1980). For cases holding that plaintiff must show defendant's "culpable participation"
in the fraud, see Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981); Rochez Bros. v.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).
93. See, e.g., S. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 § 40.04 (1974); Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Fraud Cases, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 602 (1972).
94. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 7, at 30-33.
95. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1134-35 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1025 (1975); see Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1051 (7th Cir. 1974); Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1301 (2d Cir. 1973); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 42 (10th
Cir. 1971); Gordon v. Burr, 366 F. Supp. 156, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), modified in part on other
grounds, 506 F.2d 1080 (2d Cir. 1974); Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 447
(E.D.N.Y. 1969), af'd on opinion below, 422 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970), reh'g denied, 430 F.2d
362 (1970).
96. 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
97. 521 F.2d at 1132.
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customer is to depart from reality."98 Rather, the court decided
that some lesser standard would be appropriate."
The court held that Hearst Corporation had acted in good
faith by supervising Campbell adequately.100 The newspaper had
employed Campbell for thirty years, during which time Hearst
Corporation never had received any complaints about his columns.
Campbell selected the column topic, and although the newspaper
authorized the managing editor to make any changes in the sub-
stance of the text, he never had done so.1"1 The newspaper was
unaware of Campbell's financial interest in the corporation because
it never conducted investigations into the financial affairs of its
employees without cause. Several people made inquiries about the
published article; thereafter, the newspaper stopped printing
Campbell's pieces until it completed a full investigation.102 The
court reasoned that a newspaper must expect that its employees
accurately will report facts until given reason to believe otherwise
because the practicalities of publishing a large daily newspaper
preclude having supervising editors check every item published.12
The court also found that the suspension of Campbell's column af-
ter Hearst Corporation received inquiries supported a finding of
good faith.104
Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.105 illustrates the proof of good
faith required of employers that are under a strong duty to protect
investors. The Hecht court found Wilder, a registered representa-
tive of Harris, Upham & Company, guilty of churning0 6 in an eld-
erly widow's account. The court held Harris, Upham & Company
liable as a controlling person under section 20(a) for Wilder's
fraudulent conduct.1 0 7 The court reasoned that the brokerage
98. Id. at 1135.
99. Id. See G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1981); Carpenter
v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 868 (1979); SEC v.
Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 506 F.
Supp. 554 (D.D.C. 1981).
100. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d at 1135-36.
101. Id. at 1135.
102. Id. at 1133.
103. Id. at 1135.
104. Id. at 1136.
105. 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th
Cir. 1970).
106. Churning occurs when a broker purchases and sells securities in amounts that are
excessive given the nature of his client's account. Generally, churning constitutes a fraud
under § 10(b) of the 1933 Act. Id. at 431-32.
107. Id. at 438-39.
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firm's failure to maintain an adequate system of supervision over
Wilder precluded it from escaping liability under the good faith
defense. 10 8
The court noted that standard practice1 9 in the brokerage in-
dustry requires that a partner in a firm learn the essential facts
about each customer, usually by interviewing the customer before
opening the account. Moreover, a partner must continue to super-
vise diligently the registered representative's handling of that ac-
count. The internal procedures1 0 of Harris, Upham & Company
required partners to approve any speculative trading in a woman's
account. The evidence disclosed that the partner in charge of Wil-
der never met the customer and for several years knew very little
about the account even though it was one of the firm's most ac-
tively-and often speculatively-traded and lucrative ac-
counts.112 After examining the evidence, the court concluded that
"[t]he most effective means for insuring adequate supervision is to
impose liability for injury resulting from its absence."113 Further-
more, the court found that the failure of the brokerage firm to su-
pervise Wilder demonstrated that it did "indirectly induce, partici-
pate in, approve and accept the benefits"'114 of its employee's
churning. Therefore, the firm failed to meet the requirements of
the good faith defense of section 20(a).
Taking a minority position, the Third Circuit requires plain-
tiffs who seek to establish a section 20(a) claim to demonstrate not
only control but also that the controlling person culpably partici-
pated in the securities violation.115 Critics of this requirement ar-
gue that, in effect, it imposes a burden on plaintiffs to negate the
section 20(a) good faith defense. 16 If a plaintiff shows that a con-
108. Id. See Bird v. Ferry, 497 F.2d 112, 117 (5th Cir. 1974) (Coleman, J., dissenting);
Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
109. The court examined the publications of the American Association of Stock Ex-
change Firms and the National Association of Securities Dealers to determine the standard
practice of the industry. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. at 438.
110. The court used the supervisory memorandum of Harris, Upham & Company as
evidence of the firm's internal procedures. Id.
111. The broker dealt in securities on margin and commodity futures trading for the
widow's account. Id. at 439.
112. Id.
113. Id. (quoting Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1966)).
114. 283 F. Supp. at 439.
115. See Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889-91 (3d Cir. 1975). The court held
"that secondary liability cannot be found under Section 20(a) unless it can be shown that
the defendant was a culpable participant in the fraud." Id. at 890.
116. See, e.g., Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 7, at 30-
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trolling person was a culpable participant in the fraudulent con-
duct of its employee, then clearly the controlling person cannot
demonstrate the good faith and noninducement elements of the
defense.
C. Comparison of the Scope of Liability Under Respondeat
Superior and Section 20(a)
Thus far this Note has discussed several cases that fall neatly
into the following three categories: (1) the court applies section
20(a) and holds the employer liable; (2) the court applies section
20(a) and does not hold the employer liable; and (3) the court ap-
plies respondeat superior and holds the employer liable.117 This
section of the Note analyzes each of these categories to determine
whether the court would have reached the same result had it ap-
plied respondeat superior instead of section 20(a) in the first two
categories or section 20(a) instead of respondeat superior in the
last category. This section concludes that the results are identical
under either section 20(a) or the scope of employment branch of
respondeat superior. Only the scope of liability under the apparent
authority branch of respondeat superior-as the court in Holloway
v. Howerdd115 defines it-is greater than the scope of liability
under section 20(a).
1. Employer Held Liable Under Section 20(a)-Hecht
In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co.119 the court held defendant
liable as a controlling person under section 20(a) for churning by
its employee in an elderly widow's account. If the court had ana-
lyzed the facts under respondeat superior, it nonetheless would
have held Harris, Upham & Company liable because the em-
ployee's acts were within the scope of his employment; his
purchase and sale of securities, albeit fraudulently excessive, were
acts authorized and necessary to his occupation as a stockbroker.
117. A fourth category a priori would be: the court applies respondeat superior and
holds the employer not liable. No cases, however, exist in this category.
118. 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); see supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
119. 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1968), modified on other grounds, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th
Cir. 1970); see supra notes 105-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
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2. Employer Not Liable Under Section 20(a)-Christoffel,
Rochez Brothers, & Hearst
In Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co. 120 the court held that E.F.
Hutton was not a controlling person under section 20(a) while its
employee acted as guardian of an estate. If the court had applied
respondeat superior to the facts, E.F. Hutton likewise would not
have been held liable. Because E.F. Hutton had refused to author-
ize any transactions unless the employee first obtained court ap-
proval, the employee was not acting within the scope of his em-
ployment while serving as guardian. 12 1 Furthermore, the evidence
revealed that E.F. Hutton had taken several precautionary mea-
sures to ensure that its employee acted on his own behalf and that
when he dealt with the estate no one relied on his status as an E.F.
Hutton employee. 122 Thus, E.F. Hutton would not be liable under
either a scope of employment or an apparent authority theory.
In Rochez Brothers v. Rhoades1 23 the court held that under
section 20(a) MS&R was not liable for its president's fraudulent
purchase of stock. The court noted that the president and not
MS&R was the controlling person because he owned fifty percent
of MS&R stock.12' 4 The court refused to apply respondeat superior
because to do so "would in essence impose a duty on a corporation
to supervise and oversee the activities of its directors and employ-
ees when they [were] dealing with their own corporate stock as in-
dividuals .... 1 2  The court assumes in this statement that MS&R
would be liable under respondeat superior; this assumption, how-
ever, clearly is incorrect. Apparently the court overlooked the
scope of employment requirement of the doctrine, whose purpose
is to prevent the imposition of this sort of unreasonable duty upon
the employer. When purchasing the stock, the president of MS&R
was not acting within the scope of his employment. The transac-
tion was part of a buy-sell agreement between Rhoades and
120. 588 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978); see supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
121. The court's analysis in Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973),
supports this conclusion, because acting as a guardian for an estate is not "commonly done"
by a stockbroker in the course of his employment. See supra note 66 and accompanying
text.
122. See supra text accompanying note 31.
123. 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975); see supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
124. 527 F.2d at 883; see supra note 91.
125. 527 F.2d at 885.
1982] 1405
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
MS&R. 126 Furthermore, trading in stock for a personal account is
not commonly considered to be within the scope of employment of
a director or officer.127 Because the president never made any rep-
resentation to Rochez Brothers that he was acting for MS&R in
the transaction, but rather stated to Rochez Brothers that the
purchase was for his own benefit,12 an apparent authority argu-
ment likely would fail.
In Zweig v. Hearst Corp.1 29 the Ninth Circuit held that Hearst
Corporation was not liable for the stock-price fluctuations that re-
sulted from the columnist's activities because Hearst Corporation
did not induce the securities law violations or act in bad faith.130 If
the court had applied respondeat superior, the outcome regarding
the liablity of Hearst Corporation would be debatable. Arguably,
writing an article recommending a stock is within the scope of a
financial columnist's employment. A court reasonably could con-
clude, however, that the columnist did not act within the scope of
his employment because he did not intend to benefit the Hearst
Corporation. Since his intent was to benefit himself, the court
should hold that the corporation is not liable.
3. Employer Held Liable Under Respondeat Superior-Newton,
Sharp, & Lewis
In Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank1 31 the
court held that Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Incorporated was lia-
ble under respondeat superior for its employee's fraudulent scheme
to inflate the price of a stock. If the court had applied section
20(a), it likewise would have found Pressman liable. Pressman's
registered representative used the firm's name as market maker
and Pressman's failure to realize this activity is strong evidence
that the firm's supervisory controls were insufficient to meet sec-
tion 20(a) standards.3 2 Thus, Pressman could not prove the good
faith element of the section 20(a) defense.
126. Id. at 884.
127. See supra note 66.
128. See supra text accompanying note 37.
129. 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); see supra notes 96-
104 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
130. 521 F.2d at 1133.
131. 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980); see supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
132. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. at 438-39; supra note 95 and
accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 108-14.
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In Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand'ss the court held Coopers &
Lybrand liable under respondeat superior for a tax associate's
fraudulent misrepresentation in a tax opinion letter. Like Press-
man, Coopers & Lybrand. would have been liable under section
20(a) because the partner's failure to review the opinion letter falls
short of the supervision required to invoke the good faith defense
of section 20(a).ls3 In Lewis v. Walston & Co."5' the court held
Walston & Company liable under respondeat superior for its em-
ployee's purchase of unregistered securities, although the court
also could have reached the same result under section 20(a). The
failure of Walston & Company to order its employee not to recom-
mend the unregistered stock indicates both a lack of good faith
under section 20(a) and perhaps a direct or indirect inducement of
the violation. 36
4. The Apparent Authority Case-Holloway v. Howerdd
In the majority of cases that have considered whether respon-
deat superior is available as a remedy in rule 10b-5 actions, the
resulting employer liability is identical to that found under section
20(a). Employer liability under respondeat superior is different
from section 20(a) liability only in those cases that apply apparent
authority. For example, in Holloway v. Howerddls the court ap-
plied apparent authority and held that TSI was liable only to those
investors whom TSI's employee did not tell that he was acting for
his own benefit. Under section 20(a), however, TSI would have es-
caped liability even to those investors who relied on the employee's
apparent authority. TSI was unaware of the sale of unregistered
securities by its employee and even the most stringent system of
supervision likely would have failed to uncover the fraud. Thus, if
TSI could demonstrate adequate supervision of its employees, it
successfully would fulfill the good faith and noninducement ele-
133. 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981); see supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
134. As amicus curiae, the SEC claimed in this case that Coopers & Lybrand was pri-
marily liable for the securities law violation. The Commission argued that the use of respon-
deat superior was unnecessary to impose liability because the accounting firm's name was on
the opinion letter and, thus, it held itself out to the public as responsible for the contents.
Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 7, at 2-3.
135. 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); see supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 86-95.
137. 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); see supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text for a
discussion of this case.
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ments of the section 20(a) defense.
The apparent authority situation, as Holloway presents it, is
the most difficult to resolve under respondeat superior analysis.
Clearly, the court's ultimate determination of employer liability
should rest upon its view of the purpose of respondeat superior;
hence, the court must decide whether the doctrine is fault-based or
compensatory. If the goal is to compensate the plaintiff, the em-
ployer should be liable to third parties who rely upon an em-
ployee's acts done outside the scope of employment with no intent
to benefit the employer. This Note suggests, however, that courts
should use apparent authority to impose liability on employers
only when the employer is at fault. This Note discusses the use of
apparent authority in criminal cases and advocates that courts
should apply the same parameters used therein to securities
cases-that is, they should restrict corporate and partnership lia-
bility to cases in which the employee acts for his employer's bene-
fit. This benefit limitation places a reasonable boundary on corpo-
rate responsibility and is consistent with the recently established
scienter requirement. The next part of this Note discusses whether
the use of apparent authority in securities cases is appropriate con-
sidering the scienter requirement in rule 10b-5 actions.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE RULE 10b-5 SCIENTER REQUIREMENT ON
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder13 8 the Supreme Court held
that scienter189 is a necessary element of a rule 10b-5 cause of ac-
tion. During an audit of a brokerage firm, Ernst & Ernst negli-
gently had failed to discover an officer's fraud.1 40 Plaintiffs, who
were customers of the firm, claimed that Ernst & Ernst was liable
under rule 10b-5 as an aider and abettor1 4 in the fraud. The court
dismissed the action and held that negligence is an insufficient ba-
sis of liability under rule 10b-5 because Congress' purpose in en-
acting the provision was to proscribe intentional conduct: decep-
138. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
139. See supra note 20 for a definition of scienter.
140. First Securities Company of Chicago hired Ernst & Ernst to conduct audits of the
firm's books and records. Lester B. Nay, president of First Securities, induced customers to
invest money in nonexistent escrow accounts and then took the money for his own use. 425
U.S. at 189.
141. Id. at 190. Plaintiffs claimed that Ernst & Ernst's failure properly to audit First
Securities made it an aider and abettor in the employee's fraud.
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tion, manipulation, and fraud."1 2
The Securities and Exchange Commission argued as amicus
curiae that this legislative intent to protect investors against false
and deceptive practices made a negligence standard appropriate
under rule 10b-5.14 3 Because fraud has the same effect on investors
whether it is negligent or intentional, the Commission claimed that
Congress, when enacting rule 10b-5, must not have been seeking to
distinguish the two types of conduct. 14 4 The Court rejected this ar-
gument, stating, "[The] logic of this effect-oriented approach
would impose liability for wholly faultless conduct where such con-
duct results in harm to investors, a result the Commission would
be unlikely to support. '" 4 5
Examining its holding from a policy perspective, the Court
stated in a footnote14 6 that a negligence standard would "signifi-
cantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose lia-
bility upon accountants and other experts who perform services or
express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts."1 47 The
Court feared that this threatened expansion would lead to "'a lia-
bility in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class.' "148 Furthermore, the Court warned, "'The
hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as
they enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implica-
tion of a duty that exposes [it] to these consequences.' ",49
The effect of the scienter requirement on secondary liability
under rule 10b-5 is not clear. No court of appeals has considered
the impact of Hochfelder on the respondeat superior cause of ac-
tion. The majority approach applies respondeat superior without
regard to the scienter requirement.150 Similarly, most courts have
continued to permit a cause of action for aiding and abetting under
rule 10b-5.151 Rather than hold that the scienter requirement ren-
142. Id. at 193. The Court refused to address "the question of whether, in some cir-
cumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5."
Id. at 194 n.12.
143. Id. at 212.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 198.
146. Id. at 214 n.33.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 215 n.33 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174
N.E. 441, 444 (1931) (Cardozo, C.J.)).
149. Id.
150. See supra note 15.
151. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 81.
Despite the restrictive trend in the Supreme Court, lower courts, relying on various
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ders this cause of action unavailable under the rule, these courts
have added scienter to the elements of aiding and abetting.152 One
commentator,' however, argues that Hochfelder and several other
recent decisions require strict construction of the securities acts.'"
Using this analysis, Professor Fischel contends that secondary lia-
bility,155 other than that provided in section 20(a), no longer is ap-
propriate. 58 Professor Fischel uses the factual setting of Marbury
Management, Inc. v. Kohn 57 to demonstrate his view of the effect
of scienter upon the respondeat superior cause of action. 58 In
Marbury the court held that a brokerage firm may be liable under
respondeat superior for the fraud that its trainee commits within
the scope of his employment. e59 Professor Fischel reasons that the
employer would not be primarily liable under a strict construction
of rule 10b-5 because "[a] broker-dealer that does no more than
employ an individual who engages in prohibited conduct ... has
not itself engaged in a manipulative or deceptive practice and cer-
tainly has not acted with scienter as required by Hochfelder." 60
common law doctrines, have continued to expansively interpret the scope of securities
laws in the area of secondary liability without express statutory mandates for doing so.
Every court of appeals that has faced the issue, for example, has held that a defendant
can be liable for "aiding and abetting" a violation by another defendant of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 ....
Id.
152. For example in IIT v. Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit
set forth the three requirements for aiding and abetting following Hochfelder. "(1) the exis-
tence of a securities law violation by the primary. . . party; (2) 'knowledge' of this violation
on the part of the aider and abettor; and (3) 'substantial assistance' by the aider and abettor
in achievement of the primary violation." Id. at 922.
153. See Fischel, supra note 4, at 80.
154. Professor Fischel argues that the Court's decisions in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977), Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426
(1964), demonstrated the Court's shift from the use of tort law as a basis for implying reme-
dies in securities cases. Fischel, supra note 4, at 90-91. Professor Fischel then argues that
the Court's rejection of tort law as a basis for implying remedies under the securities acts is
shown in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), and Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). Fischel, supra note 4, at 91-92. He states that
"the dispositive question in determining whether to imply a private remedy is whether Con-
gress intended to create such a remedy, regardless of tort law principles." He reasons that
"congressional intent must be equally dispositive in the secondary liablity context." Id. at
93.
155. Professor Fischel refers specifically to respondeat superior although he also ana-
lyzes the aiding and abetting and conspiracy causes of action. See Fischel, supra note 4, at
102-11.
156. Id. at 94-102.
157. 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980).
158. Fischel, supra note 4, at 106-07.
159. 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980).
160. Fischel, supra note 4, at 107.
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Professor Fischel argues that the court should impose secondary
liability only if the employer is a controlling person under section
20(a)."1 I He poses the hypothetical situation in which an employee
or agent engages in a fraudulent securities scheme and the board
of directors knows of the scheme.162 In this case the brokerage firm
would be liable because the court could impute the knowledge of
the board of directors to the firm and thus satisfy the scienter
requirement.163
Under Professor Fischel's analysis the plaintiff must overcome
a virtually insurmountable burden to obtain recovery under the se-
curities acts. How is the plaintiff to prove that a board of directors
knew of a lower-level 64 employee's fraud? Indeed, how might a
board of directors, particularly one of a large corporation, ever be
aware of such activity? Without the availability of respondeat su-
perior, the class of plaintiffs that could sue under rule 10b-5 would
shrink to a size far smaller than the one that the Supreme Court
contemplated in Hochfelder.65
An employer may be responsible or somehow at fault for his
employee's violations even though he is not aware of the wrongful
acts. A corporation only can act through its employees or agents 66
and, indeed, the question of respondeat superior never arises in
many cases because the court determines that the acts of the em-
ployees constitute corporate action. For example, in Hochfelder
plaintiffs named as defendant Ernst & Ernst, and not the individ-
ual employees who conducted the negligent audit. Apparently, the
employees' conduct unquestionably was that of the accounting firm
and plaintiffs never raised the respondeat superior issue.167 When
the board of directors knows of the employee's action and fails to
stop it, respondeat superior is not necessary because the board
constructively affirms the conduct.1 8 This ratification makes it
proper to characterize the action as corporate. In other instances,
such as Marbury, the employee's acts did not necessarily consti-
tute corporate conduct.16'9 The application of respondeat superior
161. Id.
162. Id. at 107 n.145.
163. Id.
164. Sales and clerical personnel are examples of lower-level employees.
165. See supra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
166. See Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884 (3d Cir. 1975); 10 FLETCHER,
supra note 9, § 4886.
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 82-104 (1958).
168. See id. § 94.
169. Logically, the likelihood that a court will characterize conduct as belonging to the
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in this factual situation would connect the employee and the em-
ployer by imputing the employee's conduct and intent to the em-
ployer even though the employer was unaware of the fraudulent
conduct. 170 This type of liability properly is characterizable as sec-
ondary liability-although the employer has not committed the
primary violation, he still is responsible for it. Secondary liability
is necessary to ensure that the class of potential plaintiffs under
rule 10b-5 does not diminish to a greater extent than Hochfelder
requires. 171
The appropriate question after Hochfelder is under what cir-
cumstances may a court properly impute not only the fraud but
the intent of the employee to the employer? Scienter requires some
culpability of the employer before the court can justify imposing
rule 10b-5 liability. Yet fictional entities such as corporations and
partnerships cannot possess the mental state that scienter
encompasses.
For several years courts have found corporations guilty of spe-
cific intent crimes.172 Courts have used the principle of respondeat
superior to attribute to a corporation the mens rea necessary for
conviction.'7 The courts have used the principle selectively, limit-
ing it to ensure the punishment only of culpable corporations. 7 4
An examination of the use of respondeat superior in the corporate
criminal liability context, therefore, is important to determine the
effect of the scienter requirement on rule 10b-5 respondeat supe-
rior analysis.
employer is directly proportional to the number of employees who are participating in the
fraudulent scheme. In Hochfelder several employees apparently worked on the allegedly
negligent audit and the respondeat superior question never arose. In Marbury, however,
only one employee acted fraudulently, and the employer sought-albeit unsuccessfully-to
escape liability by arguing that the trainee did not act within the scope of employment;
hence, his actions were not those of the brokerage firm.
170. See supra note 7. Respondeat superior attributes only the employee's conduct to
the employer. To justify secondary liability after Hochfelder, however, courts not only must
attribute the employee's conduct to the employer, but also his knowledge and intent. See
infra part V for a discussion of the use of the respondeat superior doctrine to attribute the
employee's intent and conduct to the employer.
171. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
172. The earliest cases that imposed criminal liability on corporations for specific in-
tent crimes arose during the period 1875-1910. See Elkins, Corporations and the Criminal
Law: An Uneasy Alliance, 65 Ky. L.J. 73, 96 & n.88 (1976). But see Mueller, Mens Rea and
the Corporation, 19 U. Pirr. L. R.v. 21, 28-32 (1957).
173. See Note, Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. Rav. 1227, 1246-51 (1979).
174. See infra part V.
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V. USE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR TO IMPOSE CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILTY
A. Case Law
The early American courts adhered to the view that they could
not find a corporation or partnership guilty of a crime because a
fictional entity could not possess a culpable mental state.17 5 The
courts first surmounted this obstacle to entity criminal liability by
extending the civil law principles of respondeat superior to crimi-
nal actions against corporations and partnerships for violations of
regulatory statutes.17 6 In New York Central & Hudson River Rail-
road v. United States17 7 the Court held a corporation criminally
liable for an employee's knowing violations of a railroad statute.
178
The Court found "no good reason why corporations may not be
held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes
of their agents, acting within the authority conferred upon them"
in criminal cases.17 9 In United States v. A & P Trucking Co.180 the
court recognized that "it is elementary that such impersonal enti-
ties [as partnerships] can be guilty of 'knowing' or 'willful' viola-
tions of regulatory statutes through the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior."19 81 Next, the courts applied respondeat superior in actions
175. See, e.g., State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360, 370 (1858) (corporations
not "liable for any crime of which a corrupt intent of malus animus is an essential ingredi-
ent"); Elkins, supra note 172, at 95-96 n.84.
176. See Elkins, supra note 172, at 89-96. Generally, the first entities held criminally
liable were quasi-corporations such as municipalities and businesses created to maintain
public roads. Their crime consisted of nuisance-or nonfeasance-for the failure to fulfill
their public duty. Id. at 93.
177. 212 U.S. 481 (1901).
178. The agent of the railroad company had made rebates to customers in violation of
the Elkins Act. Id. at 489-91.
179. Id. at 494-95. The Court also noted:
We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation
which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents and officers, shall
be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to whom
it has intrusted authority to act..., and whose knowledge and purposes may well be
attributed to the corporation for which the agents act. While the law should have re-
gard to the rights of all, and to those of corporations no less than to those of individu-
als, it cannot shut its eyes to the fact that the great majority of business transactions in
modern times are conducted through these bodies .... and to give them immunity from
all punishment because of the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot
commit a crime would virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the
subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed at.
Id. at 495-96.
180. 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
181. Id. at 125. The Court stated: "True, the common law made a distinction betwben
a corporation and a partnership, deeming the latter not a separate entity for purposes of
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against corporations and partnerships for common-law specific in-
tent crimes. 8 2 In Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth83
the court used respondeat superior to uphold a corporation's con-
viction for criminal contempt, explaining, "[A] corporation may be
liable criminally for certain offences, of which a specific intent may
be a necessary element, [because t]here is no more difficulty in im-
puting to a corporation a specific intent in criminal proceedings
than in civil."' 84 Thus, courts now accept fully the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior in criminal actions.
A finding of employer criminal liability under respondeat su-
perior requires that an employee "(1) commit a crime (2) within
the scope of employment (3) with the intent to benefit the corpora-
tion."'81 5 The federal courts will attribute the conduct of any em-
ployee to the employer under respondeat superior without regard
to the employee's status in the corporate hierarchy.88 The courts,
however, have disagreed about whether to impute an employee's
intent to the employer when no link exists between the employee's
conduct and the corporate management. The majority of courts re-
quire no connection with or authorization by corporate executives
or policy-making officials for respondeat superior to apply to the
suit. But the power of Congress to change the common-law rule is not to be doubted." Id. at
124. The Court reasoned that Congress intended to change the rule in the Motor Carrier
Act, which defendant had violated, because it expressly included a partnership within the
statute's definition of "person." Id. This logic applies with equal force under the Securities
Act of 1934 because a court may construe the term "person" to include partnerships for
purposes of the Act. See supra note 13.
Courts also have held corporations criminally liable based on the aggregate knowledge
of their employees even though no single employee had sufficient knowledge of the crime to
constitute intent. See, e.g., United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va.
1974).
182. See Elkins, supra note 172, at 96 n.88.
183. 172 Mass. 294, 52 N.E. 445 (1899).
184. Id. at 297, 52 N.E. at 446.
185. Note, supra note 173, at 1247.
186. See, e.g., United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239 (1938) (railway yard-
master violated statute by failing to notify appropriate personnel to unload cattle); Steere
Tank Lines v. United States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1963) (truck driver falsified daily logs in
violation of federal regulation); United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1963) (com-
pany president made illegal payments to union officials in violation of Taft-Hartley Act); St.
Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955) (rating clerk failed to
comply with ICC regulations); United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948)
(middle management employee's participation in illegal price fixing); United States v.
George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.) (salesmen compelled consumers to purchase
unwanted goods as condition to purchasing rationed item), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946);
United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1974) (dispatcher of truck-
ing company allowed ill driver to work in violation of ICC regulation); Elkins, supra note
172, at 106.
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employee's actions.187 For example, in St. Johnsbury Trucking Co.
v. United States s8 the court held the trucking company liable for
failure to comply with ICC regulations in labelling trucking ship-
ments even though no member of the board of directors or corpo-
rate executive knew of the illegal conduct. The court explained
that a corporation is answerable for the guilt of an agent or em-
ployee who acts within his scope of employment and "has the
guilty knowledge, in accordance with the general principles of lia-
bility as applied in determining civil liability."1189 The court held
that the corporation could not avoid criminal liability by establish-
ing that it had acted with care and had supervised adequately the
employee in an attempt to prevent the violation. 190
A minority of courts, however, refuse to impute the intent of
the subordinate employee to the corporation unless a nexus exists
between the employee's conduct and the corporation's high-level
executives. 19' People v. Canadian Fur Trappers Corp."9' demon-
strates the minority's rationale. Plaintiffs in Canadian Fur Trap-
pers charged the corporation with its salesmen's larceny. The court
distinguished the proof of intent required for larceny from the
proof required for a violation of a regulatory statute:
When it comes, however, to such crimes as larceny, there enters as a neces-
sary element the intent accompanying the act.... The mere knowledge and
intent of the agent of [sic] the servant to steal would not be sufficient in and
of itself to make the corporation guilty. While a corporation may be guilty
... of the intent to steal, the evidence must go further than in the cases
involving solely the violation of prohibitive statutes. The intent must be the
intent of the corporation, and not merely that of the agent.' 3
Although most courts reject the Canadian Fur Trappers limi-
tation on the imputation of a subordinate employee's intent to the
corporation," 4 many apply a "function" test when no link exists."95
In United States v. Armour & Co.'" the court relied upon the fol-
lowing standard: "'It is the function delegated to the corporate of-
ficer or agent which determines his power to engage the corpora-
187. See Elkins, supra note 172, at 107-08 n.124; cases cited id.
188. 220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955).
189. Id. at 398 (Magruder, C.J., concurring).
190. Id. at 398-99 (Magruder, C.J., concurring).
191. See Elkins, supra note 172, at 108-10.
192. 248 N.Y. 159, 161 N.E. 455 (1928).
193. Id. at 163, 161 N.E. at 456.
194. At least one commentator agrees with the Canadian Fur Trappers approach. See
Mueller, supra note 172, at 41-46.
195. See Elkins, supra note 172, at 106.
196. 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948).
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tion in a criminal transaction.' "l In Armour the managers and
assistant managers of a large corporation violated regulations
prohibiting tie-in sales l" s after the corporation had sent out inter-
branch correspondence and had held instructional meetings cau-
tioning against the illegal conduct. 99 The court stated that the cor-
poration's size, which made personal supervision by high-level
officials impossible and required them to rely upon managers to
exercise due care, did not relieve the corporation of its duty to
eliminate tie-in sales.2 00 The supervisory function that the corpo-
rate executives delegated to the assistant managers and managers
gave these employees the ability to bind the corporation for their
criminal acts. The court based liability upon the nonperformance
of a nondelegable duty of supervision and technically not upon re-
spondeat superior. The court reasoned that an officer must stand
or fall on his selection of employees to fulfill the corporate duty to
eliminate regulatory violations.20
The Fifth Circuit rejected the function test in Standard Oil
Co. of Texas v. United States'" in which the subordinate em-
ployee of an oil company participated in a scheme to sell oil in
violation of the Connally Hot Oil Act.20 3 The district court used
the function test to find the corporation criminally liable for the
employee's conduct. The court of appeals reversed, holding that
the employee did not act within the scope of his employment be-
cause he intended to defraud the oil company, not to benefit it.2 4
The court stated:
It is for this reason that the simple "function" test applied by the Dis-
trict Court-while obviously a factor of relevance-is alone insufficient upon
which to rest convictions here. Thus the taking in or paying out of money by
a bank teller, while certainly one of his regular functions, would hardly cast
the corporation for criminal liability if in such "handling" the faithless em-
ployee was pocketing the funds as an embezzler or handing them over to a
confederate under some ruse.20 5
197. Id. at 344 (quoting C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150 F.2d 85, 89 (9th Cir. 1945)).
198. A tie-in sale occurs when a company forces its customers to buy one product as a
condition for the sale of another product. See 168 F.2d at 343.
199. Id. at 342-43.
200. Id. at 343-44.
201. Id. (quoting Cardozo, C.J., in People v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225
N.Y. 25, 30, 121 N.E. 474, 476 (1918)).
202. 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
203. Connally Hot Oil Act, ch. 18, 49 Stat. 30 (1935) (current version at 15 U.S.C. S
715-7151 (1976)).
204. 307 F.2d at 128-29.
205. Id. at 128 (footnote omitted).
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B. Model Penal Code
The Model Penal Code provision that addresses the liability of
corporations or associations for crimes committed by their agents
states in relevant part:
(1) A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if:
(a) the offense is a violation or the offense is defined by a statute... in
which a legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly
appears and the conduct is performed by an agent of the corporation
acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or em-
ployment. . . ; or
(b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty or
affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or
(c) the commission of the offense was authorized, requested, com-
manded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or
by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within
the scope of his office or employment. ' "
The Code contains a due diligence defense for a corporation prose-
cuted under section 1(a), which allows it to avoid liability if it can
prove that "the high managerial agent having supervisory responsi-
bility over the subject matter of the offense employed due dili-
gence to prevent its commission."207 The Code defines a "high
managerial agent" as an officer of a corporation, a partner in a
partnership, or any other agent of a corporation or association
"having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be
assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or
association. 2 08
The Model Penal Code approach to corporate liability in sec-
tion 1(a) is similar to the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Standard Oil2
in that the Code will not impose criminal liability unless the agent
acts on behalf of the corporation. The comments to this section
explain that the drafters inserted the phrase "in behalf of the cor-
poration" to ensure that a court would not hold a corporation lia-
ble for acts of its agents that are detrimental to the corporation.1 0
Accordingly, although the bank teller's conduct in the hypothetical
206. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(l) (proposed official draft 1962). Section 2.07(3), which
applies to unincorporated associations, is very similar to § 2.07(1)(a) and (b) except that it
does not include a subpart analogous to § 2.07(1)(c), because such a provision would raise
"far too many controversial questions to be feasibly included in the Code." Id. § 2.07 note
on status of section, revision 3.
207. Id. § 2.07(5).
208. Id. § 2.07(4).
209. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
210. See Elkins, supra note 172, at 111.
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situation set forth in Standard Oil... would suffice to impose crim-
inal liability under the "function" test, the behavior would not re-
sult in a similar finding under this Code section.
One author suggested that if read strictly, section 1(a) is not
necessarily consistent with the Standard Oil corporate benefit re-
quirement.2 12 "'[In behalf of the corporation'" may define merely
the relationship between the agent and the corporation and not
necessarily require that the agent intended to benefit the corpora-
tion.21 3 Thus, under this strict construction an agent may act "in
behalf of" the corporation, even though he benefits solely himself
and harms the corporation.21 4 Although this interpretation does
not conflict with the actual language of the section, the comments
clearly show that this approach is contrary to the drafters'
intent. 15
The due diligence defense for employers in criminal actions
under section 1(a) emphasizes the employer's status within the
corporation in determining whether corporate liability is appropri-
ate. The defense comports with the Canadian Fur Trappers216 lim-
itation on imputing a subordinate employee's intent to the em-
ployer by recognizing that the corporation, and not merely the
agent, must have intended the act.2 17 The defense requires some
"link" with high-level officials for corporate liability and thus is
similar to the good faith defense of section 20(a). Both provisions
are aimed at protecting an employer or a controlling person from
liability when he has maintained an adequate supervisory system.
The focus upon supervision in the Code's due diligence de-
fense is somewhat analogous to the Third Circuit's respondeat su-
perior exception for firms under a high duty to protect the invest-
ing public.218 The Third Circuit's analysis imputes liability in one
step: once a court determines that a firm is under a high standard
of care to supervise its employees, the court will impute to the em-
ployer the fraud committed by any employee within the scope of
his employment.2 19 The Model Penal Code, however, adds an inter-
211. See supra text accompanying note 205.
212. See Elkins, supra note 172, at 111-12.
213. Id. at 112.
214. Id.
215. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
217. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
219. Id. A determination by the court that a defendant is under a high standard of
care to supervise employees in order to protect the investing public triggers the respondeat
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mediate step to its analysis. The Code first will impute a sub-
ordinate employee's illegal conduct to a high managerial supervi-
sor; if the latter fails to show due diligence, then the second step
imputes the employee's conduct and intent to the employer
corporation.220
Section 1(b) of the Model Penal Code adopts in part the func-
tion test that some courts have applied.2 21 The section, however,
limits the use of the standard to situations in which the law has
imposed upon the employer the duty that he delegated to the em-
ployee. Examples of these nondelegable duties include unloading
cattle within statutorily prescribed time limits,2 12 and the filing of
daily logs by trucking companies. 2 ' As these examples demon-
strate, the aim of the section is to impose liability only upon corpo-
rations that fail to fulfill their affirmative statutory duties.2 4
Hence, in the Standard Oil hypothetical situation,2 the bank as
employer of the teller would not be liable under this section be-
cause the law does not impose upon the bank an affirmative duty
to hand out and take in money. The presence of section 1(a) with
its benefit requirement ensures that section 1(b) of the Code is not
subject to interpretation as a whole-hearted adoption of the func-
tion test.
Finally, section 1(c) of the Code228 focuses upon violations by
subordinate employees that high-level managerial officials have au-
thorized, ratified, or recklessly permitted. This provision is consis-
tent with section 20(a) because both penalize employers who fail to
supervise adequately their employees or who direct their employ-
ees to act illegally. Clearly, if a corporation approves of an em-
ployee's illegal conduct, the corporation likely intended the con-
duct and should be responsible for it.227
superior attribution process. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir.
1981).
220. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
222. See United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239 (1938); Note, supra note
173, at 1253 n.55.
223. See United States v. E. Brooke Matlack, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 814 (D. Md. 1957);
Note, supra note 173, at 1253 n.55.
224. 149 F. Supp. at 819-20.
225. See supra text accompanying note 205.
226. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (proposed official draft 1962).
227. Professor Fischel's hypothetical brokerage firm, supra text accompanying notes




C. Proposed Federal Criminal Codes
Both the Senate22 and the House of Representatives 229 ver-
sions of the proposed federal criminal code provide that an organi-
zation, whose definition includes corporations and partnerships, 230
can be criminally liable for the acts of its agents that are within
the scope of their employment or authority and are intended to
benefit the organization. 23' Both versions also impose liability for
acts of agents that the organization ratifies.3 2 Furthermore, the
proposed criminal code holds liable employers who fail to dis-
charge specific duties imposed on the organization by law.23 These
provisions include the Standard Oil benefit requirement and reject
the function test analysis in a manner that is consistent with the
Model Penal Code approach.
The Senate and House versions differ from the corresponding
Model Penal Code provision 234 because they do not contain a due
diligence defense. Thus, they do not limit the imputation of a
subordinate employee's intent to the employer. Moreover, they re-
ject the minority requirement of a link between high-level execu-
tives and subordinate culpable activity set forth in Canadian Fur
Trappers.235 Rather, the proposed code adheres to the following
three general requirements of the criminal law doctrine of respon-
deat superior: That an employee commit the crime with the re-
quired intent, in the scope of employment, and with an intent to
benefit the organization. 3 6
VI. CONCLUSION
The limitations that courts have placed upon respondeat supe-
rior analysis in the criminal law context demonstrate an unwilling-
ness to hold an entity liable for the conduct of employees that is
beyond its control. The Standard Oil benefit requirement, present
in the Model Penal Code and in both versions of the proposed fed-
eral criminal code, recognizes that courts should not attribute to
228. S. 1630, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. S9769-76 (1981).
229. H.R. 4711, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. H7195 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1981);
H.R. 1647, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. H370 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1981).
230. H.R. 1647, supra note 229, § 101(29).
231. Id. § 502(1)(B).
232. Id.
233. Id. § 502(2).
234. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
236. See supra note 185.
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an employer the intent of an employee who acts solely for his own
benefit and outside the scope of his employment. Further, an em-
ployer cannot necessarily prevent such conduct through due care
and adequate supervision. In this situation, therefore, employer
criminal liability serves no purpose. By imposing a penalty only
when an employee commits a crime within the scope of employ-
ment with at least some intent to benefit the employer, the deter-
rent value of the sanction remains effective.3 7
The reasons for limiting respondeat superior liability in the
criminal law context apply equally to rule 10b-5 violations since
Hochfelder announced the scienter requirement for rule 10b-5 lia-
bility. If courts will impute the conduct and intent of an employee
to the employer in order to fulfill this requirement, then they must
limit the imputation to instances in which the employer is some-
how responsible for the fraudulent conduct. The benefit require-
ment ensures this result. If an employee intends to benefit an em-
ployer by his actions, courts reasonably may impute fraudulent
intent to the employer. If an employee is not acting within the
scope of employment or for his employer's benefit, the employer's
participation in the fraudulent conduct does not logically follow in
a manner consistent with the scienter requirement.
This benefit requirement equates the scope of liability under
respondeat superior and the scope under section 20(a). Under the
courts' present analysis, disparate results under respondeat supe-
rior and section 20(a) occur only when an employee acts within his
apparent authority with no intent to benefit the employer.2 38 The
adoption of the benefit requirement, however, would preclude em-
ployer liability under both respondeat superior and section 20(a) in
a factual situation such as Holloway v. Howerdd,3 e in which the
corporation was unaware of its employee's fraudulent stock sales
even though it acted with due care and adequate supervision. The
Holloway decision, which imposed liability on apparent authority
grounds, emphasized the protection of defrauded investors. Al-
though its concern is consistent with the purposes of the securities
acts,24 e to extend this protection until employer's liability is
237. If an employer is liable for any and all of the acts of employees, then the incen-
tive to control and supervise employees' actions decreases.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 61-75, 86-96 & 137.
239. 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976). See supra text accompanying notes 76-85 for a dis-
cussion of this case.
240. See supra text accompanying note 143.
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equivalent to insurer's liability is unreasonable.241 A court realisti-
cally could not hold that TSI intended its employee's fraudulent
conduct in view of the scienter requirement of rule 10b-5. Applica-
tion of the benefit limitation would prevent this imputation.
This suggested approach to respondeat superior liability does
not change significantly employer liability under rule 10b-5. Be-
cause only one apparent authority case has arisen under the securi-
ties acts,242 and none specifically under rule 10b-5, scope of em-
ployment is flexible and broad enough to cover most rule 10b-5
respondeat superior claims. The benefit requirement, which, in ef-
fect, precludes use of apparent authority as a basis for liability,
simply ensures that a court will not hold an employer liable for the
violations of his employees who are acting on their own behalf.
Only rarely is an employee's conduct distinguishable from that of
the employer. The scienter requirement, however, mandates that
the courts recognize the distinction.
CAROL M. LYNCH*
241. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
242. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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